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Hypocrisy and Corruption: How Disparities
in Power Shape the Evolution of Social
Control
Omar Tonsi Eldakar1, J. Oliver Kammeyer2, Nikhil Nagabandi1,
and Andrew C. Gallup3
Abstract
Altruism presents an evolutionary paradox, as altruistic individuals are good for the group yet vulnerable to exploitation by selfish
individuals. One mechanism that can effectively curtail selfishness within groups is punishment. Here, we show in an evolutionary
game-theoretical model that punishment can effectively evolve and maintain high levels of altruism in the population, yet not all
punishment strategies were equally virtuous. Unlike typical models of social evolution, we explicitly altered the extent to which
individuals vary in their power over others, such that powerful individuals can more readily punish and escape the punishment of
others. Two primary findings emerged. Under large power asymmetries, a powerful selfish minority maintained altruism of the
masses. In contrast, increased symmetry of power among individuals produced a more egalitarian society held together by
altruism and punishment carried out by the collective. These extremes are consistent with the coercive nature of the powerful
elites in social insects and egalitarian mechanisms of punishment in humans such as coalitional enforcement and gossip. Our overall
findings provide insights into the importance of oversight, the consequences to changes in the power structure of social systems,
and the roots of hypocrisy and corruption in human and nonhuman animal societies.
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Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Great men are almost always bad men.
—John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton in letter to Bishop
Mandell Creighton (1887, p. 504; Acton, 1907)
The evolution of altruism has remained a popular topic explored
by biologists, psychologists, and philosophers alike. If selection
favors individuals with traits that confer an advantage over their
rivals, then helping others seems paradoxical. This notion, how-
ever, is an oversimplified and antiquated view of how natural
selection acts on populations (Eldakar & Wilson, 2011). When
comparing fitness differences within groups, selfishness (cheat-
ing) always beats altruism (helping). However, as selfishness
increases in frequency within a group, the average fitness of all
group members (including the selfish individuals) in the popu-
lation decreases compared to individuals within more altruistic
groups (e.g., the tragedy of the commons, Hardin, 1968; Rankin,
Bargum, & Kokko, 2007). Therefore, if groups vary in the
proportion of altruists, then the differential contribution of
groups to the total gene pool can favor altruism despite their
selective disadvantage within groups (Eldakar & Wilson,
2011; Wilson, 1975; Wilson & Wilson, 2007).
One way to reduce or eliminate the advantage (or frequency)
of selfishness within groups is through punishment. The
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concept of punishment is quite simple; individuals suffer fit-
ness costs for behaving selfishly, thereby eliminating the local
selective advantage of selfishness. The evolution of punish-
ment, however, is not as simple. Individuals incur personal
costs to inflict punishment on others; therefore, if members
of the group benefit from punishment but do not share in the
costs, punishment is subject to the same local disadvantage as
altruism (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, 2004; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles,
& Richerson, 2003; Eldakar, Gallup, & Driscoll, 2013; Eldakar
& Wilson, 2008; Fehr, 2004; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004;
Yamagishi, 1986). There are two ways by which punishers can
directly overcome this disadvantage within groups.
The first is for punishers to counterbalance punishment costs
by themselves behaving selfishly. These selfish punishers incur
the costs of punishment, yet recoup these losses by hypocriti-
cally behaving selfishly in other social interactions, particularly
the very same behavior they themselves prohibit (Eldakar,
Farrell, & Wilson, 2007; Eldakar et al., 2013; Eldakar &
Wilson, 2008; Eldakar, Wilson, & O’Gorman, 2006; Nakamaru
& Iwasa, 2006). For example, in the tree wasp (Dolichovespula
sylvestris), individuals that police against worker-laid eggs are
also those most likely to cheat and lay eggs themselves, appro-
priately deemed “corrupt policing” (Wenseleers, Tofilski, &
Ratnieks, 2005). Similar hypocritical interactions occur even
within multicellular organisms as cancerous tumors have been
shown to inhibit the growth of other tumors (Camphausen
et al., 2001; Guba et al., 2001). With regard to human social
behavior, examples range from criminal organizations such as
the Mafia reducing local crime rates (Fiorentini & Peltzman,
1995; Lupo, 2013) to socially dominant preschoolers compel-
ling their peers to follow the rules while they themselves do not
(Hawley & Geldhof, 2012).
The second mechanism in which punishers can overcome
their local disadvantage is through power asymmetries. Natural
selection is based on the premise that there is variation among
individuals. While it is commonly assumed that individuals
vary in their propensity for altruism and punishment, this is
not widely incorporated into research studies (de Weerd &
Verbrugge, 2011; Przepiorka & Diekmann, 2013; U´beda &
Due´n˜ez-Guzma´n, 2011). In other words, the costs of perform-
ing punishment are unlikely to be the same for all. Punishment
is relatively more cost-effective for individuals that hold an
asymmetric power advantage over their peers. Specifically, it
has been shown that college students coming from families
with greater financial and social resources are more likely to
punish transgressors in experimental economic games
(O’Brien, Gallup, & Eldakar, 2013). Furthermore, individuals
in positions of power and high resource availability may also
face relatively lower costs of committing transgressions. Thus,
when coupled with the notion of selfish punishment, it is pos-
sible for punishment to actually be locally advantageous for
some. For example, nonhuman primate dominance hierarchies
are maintained through power asymmetries, and it is often the
case that those with power both perform punishment and act
selfishly (Boehm, 1999; de Waal, 1990; Flack, de Waal, &
Krakauer, 2005; Flack, Girvan, de Waal, & Krakauer, 2006).
Specifically, in pigtailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina), pow-
erful individuals are the most likely to perform types of punish-
ment that both reduce within-group conflict (Flack et al., 2005)
and stabilize social niches (Flack et al., 2006). Furthermore, in
rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), high-ranking males punish
individuals for failing to announce their discovery of food, yet
avoid punishment for their own deception (Hauser & Marler,
1993). These implications extend to modern human society
whereby hypocrisy in the form of corruption (abuse of author-
ity for selfish gains) springs up among those in powerful posi-
tions of enforcement and/or governance (Rose-Ackerman,
1999a, 1999b, 2008).
Our previous studies have demonstrated that selfish punish-
ment is more likely to evolve in populations than altruistic
punishment (defined here as punishers that do not act selfishly)
because individuals possessing the former strategy are able to
recoup punishment costs (Eldakar et al., 2007, 2013; Eldakar &
Wilson, 2008). However, we have also recently shown that
selfish punishment transitions to altruistic punishment once
selfishness is driven to exceedingly low levels and the cost of
punishment is effectively reduced, allowing the population to
attain greater levels of altruism (for an extended discussion, see
Eldakar et al., 2013). Although human societies may at times
resemble this overall transition (e.g., autocratic to democratic
republics, Linz, 1990; from Mafia to government, Fiorentini &
Peltzman, 1995; Lupo, 2013; from bands of thugs to honorable
knights, Bisson, 1994), the same transition cannot be said for
the individuals. Within populations, existing genetic variation
in the proclivity to punish (McDermott, Tingley, Cowden,
Frazzetto, & Johnson, 2009), as well as evidence of diverse
punishment strategies in empirical studies (Eldakar et al.,
2006; O’Brien et al., 2013), suggests an existing blend of pun-
ishment strategies. The maintenance of these heterogeneous
punishment tactics is likely attributed to fluctuations in popu-
lation density, cost/benefit structure, group size, group long-
evity, and power asymmetries.
Here, we investigate the role of power asymmetries in the
evolution of altruism and punishment through the use of an
agent-based simulation model. Our model highlights three
important factors in the evolution of selfish punishment
(i.e., hypocrisy and corruption): (1) the disparity in power
among individuals, (2) the proportion of individuals in the
population that possess power, and (3) the severity of conse-
quences for committing social transgressions. Further under-
standing the role of power asymmetries in the evolution of
enforcement strategies is crucial for untangling the evolution-
ary paradox of punishment across the animal kingdom as well
as providing insights into the roots of hypocrisy and corrup-
tion in human society.
The Model
The agent-based simulation was constructed from the equations
presented here in the analytical model. Although insightful, the
equations illustrate what occurs from the perspective of an
individual within a given group and does not account for the
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average fitness of each strategy across groups and thus are not
intended to represent population-level outcomes. The simula-
tion occurs in a large interacting multigroup population. There-
fore, the average fitness of each strategy is the result of the
average experience of all individual agents of that strategy in
the overall population. The simulation model was implemented
using the agent-based modeling program Netlogo 6.0.2, which
is freely available for download (for Netlogo program, see
http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/; contact corresponding
author for annotated code).
The model is an evolutionary game–theoretical model based
on the standard public goods game often employed in the
experimental economics literature (e.g., Fehr & Gachter,
2000). Specifically, this model is closely based on our previous
model with the addition of power asymmetries and conditional
strategies (Eldakar et al., 2013). The model begins with a pop-
ulation (size ¼ N) with individuals that are either altruistic or
selfish and either punish or do not punish, creating four possi-
ble strategies: altruistic nonpunishers (an), selfish nonpunishers
(sn), altruistic punishers (ap), and selfish punishers (sp). Indi-
viduals associate in a large number of groups (size ¼ n) and
interact for a number of iterations (I) in a two-phase public
goods game. For the initial phase (cooperation), all individuals
are endowed with a resource (value ¼ R) with altruists con-
tributing their entire share to the group while selfish individuals
withhold the resource. Contributions to the group (by altruists
within the group, naR) are multiplied by a value (m) and then
distributed equally among all group members. This is biologi-
cally sound as the combined effort of the group yields a greater
return than the sum of individual efforts, for instance, with
group hunting, or the modification of the local environment
by microbes (Driscoll, Espinosa, Eldakar, & Hackett, 2013).
After the cooperation phase, the fitness of altruists (wa) and
selfish individuals (ws) is represented by Equations 1 and 2,
respectively. Individuals maximize their fitness within groups
by withholding the resource, while overall group fitness is
maximized by altruism, producing the classic struggle between
altruism and selfishness.
wa ¼ naRm
n
: ð1Þ
ws ¼ Rþ naRm
n
: ð2Þ
For each iteration, the cooperation phase is followed by the
punishment phase in which punishers pay a cost (C) in an
attempt to expel each selfish member of the group. Therefore,
the total cost of punishment for individuals is the product of the
cost of punishment (C) and the number of selfish individuals
(ns) in the group (ns  1; selfish punishers do not punish
themselves).
Power asymmetry and conditional strategies. Before social inter-
actions take place each generation, a proportion of the popula-
tion (P ¼ .05 to .50) is randomly attributed a power advantage
over their peers. This advantage reduces the cost of punish-
ment, as well as the chance of being punished by a factor (x)
that ranges between 0 and 1. Individuals endowed with this
advantage experience (x), whereas the remaining (1  P)%
of the population experience x ¼ 1. In essence (x) represents
a symmetry of power and (1  x) represents the disparity in
power in the population.
All individuals also possess a conditional strategy that is
triggered in the powerful of the population. This conditional
strategy is merely a genetic tendency to switch from their
default strategy (one of the four strategies: an, ap, sn, and sp)
to an alternative strategy (individuals that possess the same
default and conditional strategy experience no change). In
other words, an individual with an as their default strategy
and sp as their conditional strategy will be born and behave
as an an but switch to sp if among the P% the population
attributed power. While both default and conditional strate-
gies are inherited from parent to offspring, power is entirely
random, thus selection can favor one set of strategies among
the powerful and a separate set within the rest of the popula-
tion. Therefore, it can be observed that certain strategies are
only adaptive to express when powerful or not powerful. At
the conclusion of each round, overall fitness of altruistic and
selfish nonpunishers is represented by Equations 1 and 2,
respectively, and altruistic and selfish punishers represented
by Equations 3 and 4, respectively.
wap ¼ naRm
n
 xCns: ð3Þ
wsp ¼ Rþ naRm
n
 xCðns  1Þ: ð4Þ
The consequence of punishment is expulsion from the
remaining social interactions of the group. The probability
of punishment by a single punisher is represented by the term
(D) which can vary from 0 to 1. Therefore, the chance of
escaping a given punisher is (1  D), while the chance of
escaping all punishers in the group (np) is (1  D)np , leaving
the overall chance of punishment represented by Equation 5.
Note the chance of punishment is reduced by (x) for powerful
individuals, whereas x¼ 1 for nonpowerful individuals. In the
mathematical sense, powerful individuals are assumed less
likely to be punished. This evasion can be achieved biologi-
cally through a greater capability of evading detection, fend-
ing off punishers, or merely deterring potential punishers
through fear of retribution.
ð1 ð1 DÞnpÞx: ð5Þ
Punished individuals are excluded from all subsequent itera-
tions for that generation and replaced by individuals drawn
randomly from a pool based on the initial frequencies at the
start of the current generation. Although replacements play
fewer rounds than the original members, they still contribute
to fitness differentials of the overall strategies in the total pop-
ulation. In addition, individuals die if possessing a fitness of
0 at any point, in which case they are replaced in the same
manner as those expelled.
Expelled individuals continue to receive the resource
endowment for the remaining iterations (e), but this is reduced
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by the cost of solitary behavior (S; also considered the conse-
quence of punishment) that ranges from 0.05 to 1, such that an
S of 0.05 is extremely harsh while when S¼ 1 produces no real
consequences from punishment. This reduced payoff is
assumed as social animals forced into a solitary existence likely
suffer significant fitness consequences. Therefore, the total fit-
ness after all iterations (I) for selfish nonpunishers and selfish
punishers is represented by Equations 6 and 7, respectively.
ws ¼

Rþ naRm
n

ðI  eÞ þ RSe: ð6Þ
wsp ¼ Rþ naRm
n
 xCðns  1Þ
 
ðI  eÞ þ RSe: ð7Þ
After completion of the iterations, all individuals (including
those expelled) reproduce asexually in proportion to their rela-
tive fitness in the overall population and then die. Offspring
assumes the strategy (default and conditional) of the parentwith a
chanceofmutating to any strategies and thendisperse to a random
group to begin the next cycle of interactions. Figure 1 provides an
illustrative summary of themodel, andTable 1 shows the baseline
conditions. Solitary (S) and symmetry of power (x) were varied
from 0.05 to 1.0 in increments of 0.05. The distribution of power
as measured by the proportion of powerful to not powerful indi-
viduals (P) was varied from 0.05 to 0.5. The proportion of pow-
erful individuals was not extended beyond 50% of the population
as then powerful becomes just the norm. Each variable set was
replicated 10 times and compared for consistency. Output vari-
ables for statistical analysis were the averages across the replicate
runs on the final frequencies of the default strategies, conditional
strategies, and phenotypically expressed strategies. Furthermore,
total altruism was considered as the phenotypic expression of
altruism in the cooperation phase, which was the sum of both
altruistic punisher and nonpunisher phenotypes.
Results
Enforcement and Altruism
Overall, simulated populations were attracted to one of the
three equilibriums based on the combination of variables
related to power. One of these equilibriums was pure selfish-
ness (selfish nonpunishers) in both phenotypic expression and a
conditional strategy. The other two equilibrium points involved
a dimorphic population of altruistic nonpunishers along with
either selfish punishers or altruistic punishers. Typical runs
quickly settle on one of the three equilibriums within a few
hundred generations and remain stable over time (Figure 2).
Total altruism in the population (as measured by the fre-
quency of individuals expressing the altruism phenotype in the
cooperation phase) evolves under a wide range of conditions
so long as there are meaningful consequences for punishment
(S > 0.5), such that cheating is not performed with impunity.
However, the same cannot be said for the punishment strategies
that maintain altruism. Overall, a minority of powerful selfish
punishers both maintains altruism when there is low symmetry
of power and when power is concentrated among a few
individuals (Figure 3). These equilibriums involving selfish
punishers resulted in the selfish punishment conditional strat-
egy, reaching fixation (>99% of the population), albeit its fre-
quency of phenotypic expression was limited by the abundance
of powerful individuals (P). In contrast, as power is essentially
decentralized by increasing symmetry of power and spreading
power among a greater portion of the population, altruistic
punishers maintain altruism (Figure 3).
Despite both punishment strategies—whether altruistic or
selfish—maintaining altruism in the model, the extent to which
it is maintained is considerable. Populations under the govern-
ance of altruistic punishment flourish with the phenotypic
expression of altruism attaining fixation (>99% of the
Figure 1. The population begins at set initial frequencies of strategies
and individuals disperse randomly to groups (size n). Power is assigned
randomly to P% of the population at the value (x). These individuals
also employ their conditional strategy while the remainder of the
population is set x ¼ 1 and carry out their default strategy. Individuals
interact within groups involving a cooperation phase and punishment
for a set number of iterations (total number of iterations ¼ I). Fol-
lowing each iteration less than (I), individuals may remain in groups, die
due to a fitness (W) of 0, or be expelled if the chance of being
punished (1  (1  D)np)x is greater than a random value between 0
and 1 (z). Once banished, the punished individuals acquire a fitness of
R*S (resources, reduced by solitary life) for the remaining iterations
(e). Groups losing interacting members to either death and/or pun-
ishment are randomly filled to the set group size by individuals drawn
from the population stock of the same frequencies from the beginning
of the generation. At the conclusion of the iterations, individuals from
both the interacting population and the punishment patch reproduce
asexually (with a chance of mutationM) in proportion to their relative
fitness in the overall population and then die, thus updating the pop-
ulation frequencies and beginning the next generation.
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population; Figures 3–5). Populations, and more specifically,
groups, under the enforcement of selfish punishers are effective
but not efficient at promoting high levels of altruism. Despite
the benefit of prohibiting other selfish individuals, the presence
of a selfish punisher guarantees the existence of at least one
selfish group member (his/herself), a downside not experienced
with altruistic punishment. Therefore, selfish punishment can
maintain altruism but at the same time hold back overall group-
and population-level productivity.
Power Corrupts
Factors that contribute to the emergence of one enforcement
strategy over the alternative are those that influence power in
some way. Both symmetry and the distribution of power as well
as the consequences to punishment largely shape the mechan-
isms of enforcement in our model. Specifically, when holding
all other factors constant, merely increasing the disparity in
power (reducing symmetry) pushes the population from altruis-
tic to selfish punishment (Figures 3 and 4). Furthermore, essen-
tially centralizing power also favors selfish punishment
(Figures 3 and 5). Lastly, weak consequences of punishment
(e.g., lack of oversight) also favor selfish punishment as an
enforcement strategy (Figures 4 and 5).
To further illustrate the role of power in favoring selfish
punishment, multiple regression analyses were performed
across the mean outcomes for all variable conditions (solitary
S, power symmetry x, and the distribution of power P) with the
average ending frequency of the selfish punisher conditional
strategy as the dependent variable. Overall, decreasing symme-
try of power (x; b¼0.727, df¼ 3,996, p < .001) and reducing
the distribution of power (P; b¼ 0.383, df ¼ 3,996, p < .001)
both significantly favor the selfish punisher strategy. In other
words, increasing power, whether it is through physical or other
resource asymmetries, and concentrating and centralizing
power lead to increased hypocrisy, corruption, and coercion.
However, increasing solitary value (S)—or reducing the sever-
ity of punishment—is negatively associated with selfish pun-
ishment (b¼0.517, df¼ 3,996, p < .001). This relationship is
misleading as once solitary (S) exceeds a value of 0.55, pure
Table 1. Definition of Variables With Baseline Values.a
Variable Baseline Definition
N 50,000 Total population size
n 5 Group size
I 10 Iterations played within each group per
generation
R 10 Resources allocated each iteration
C 5 Cost of punishing each selfish individual
D 0.7 The probability of a single punisher detecting and
punishing a given cheater
S 0.4 Consequence of punishment. Cost of reduced
fitness due to solitary life each round
M 1  103 Mutation rate
x 0.5 Proportion of punishment cost paid by powerful
individuals and value of reduced probability of
being punished
P 0.30 Distribution of power as measured by the
frequency of powerful individuals in the
population
dan 0.45 Initial frequency of altruistic nonpunisher default
trait
dap 0.05 Initial frequency of altruistic punisher default trait
dsn 0.45 Initial frequency of selfish nonpunisher default
trait
dsp 0.05 Initial frequency of selfish punisher default trait
can 0.25 Initial frequency of altruistic nonpunisher
conditional strategy
cap 0.25 Initial frequency of altruistic punisher conditional
strategy
csn 0.25 Initial frequency of selfish nonpunisher
conditional strategy
csp 0.25 Initial frequency of selfish punisher conditional
strategy
aSimulations Were Terminated After 3,000 Generations (30,000 Iterations)
With Typical Simulations Stabilizing Well Within 300 Generations (see
Figure 2).
Figure 2. Time-series plot of populations in baseline conditions
showing the frequency of certain traits over the course of 1,000
generations, with populations settling in under 300 generations and
remaining stable thereafter (note that time is condensed on the x-axis
after the 300th generation). Line widths represent the 95% CI inter-
vals from 100 replications. Under baseline conditions, the selfish
nonpunisher strategy readily becomes extinct and is soon joined by
the altruistic punisher strategy. The remaining population consists of a
mix of roughly 64% altruistic nonpunisher and 36% selfish punisher
strategies. This almost exactly represents the mixture of nonpowerful
(70%) and powerful individuals (30%) in the population. Furthermore,
the distribution of cooperation and punishment strategies greatly
coincides with power dynamics. The conditional selfish punisher trait,
or in other words, if you are powerful then switch your strategy to selfish
punisher evolves to fixation (99%), thus accounting for the over-
whelming majority of selfish punishers in the population. Furthermore,
the altruistic nonpunisher default trait, or otherwise the if weak then
play altruistic non-punisher, evolves to *91% of the population. Thus,
while being phenotypically mixed, this dimorphic population is a result
of the overwhelming majority of the population expressing a single
strategy, that is, switch in the selfish punisher strategy when powerful
but behave as an altruistic nonpunisher when not.
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selfishness is favored, leading to the overall extinction of all
other strategies including selfish punishers (see Figures 4
and 5). An additional multiple regression analysis only includ-
ing conditions up to S¼ 0.55 revealed a relationship with S that
conformed to what is depicted in Figures 4 and 5 and expected
overall. Reducing the severity of punishment up to a point
favors selfish punishment (b ¼ 0.217, df ¼ 2,196, p < .001)
but then leads to the collapse of altruism and enforcement
thereafter. Furthermore, the relationships with symmetry of
power (x) and distribution of power (P) become even more
robust (x: b ¼ 1.001, df ¼ 2,196, p < .001; P: b ¼ 0.931,
df ¼ 2,196, p < .001).
Power of the Masses
In contrast, under conditions of little to no difference between
individuals in power, the population is comprised of a mixed
equilibrium of altruistic punishers and nonpunishers (see
Figures 3 and 4). These equilibriums experience oscillations
of both strategies at*50% in phenotypic expression and con-
ditional traits. This was attributed to both drift and slight fitness
differences between altruistic punishment and altruistic non-
punishment strategies resulting from the consistent reintroduc-
tion of selfish individuals through mutation (also, see Eldakar
et al., 2007). Overall, increasing the symmetry and/or distribu-
tion of power favors altruistic punishment over selfish punish-
ment in populations. Furthermore, increasing the severity of
punishment also favors altruistic punishment over selfish pun-
ishment (Figures 4 and 5).
The conditions favoring altruistic punishment were further
supported by a similar multiple regression analysis with the
conditional strategy of altruistic punishment as the dependent
variable. All things considered, altruistic punishment is favored
Figure 3. When holding all other variables at baseline conditions
(most notably, S ¼ 0.4), the variation of symmetry of power (x) and
proportion of powerful individuals (P) produces one of the two mixed
equilibriums. The solid line indicates the boundary between conditions
producing either equilibrium. Below the line (light gray background), in
conditions consisting of low proportions of power individuals and low
symmetry of power between individuals, selfish punishment became
fixed (>99% of the population) as the preferred conditional strategy,
leading the population to converge on dimorphic equilibrium com-
prised of a minority of powerful selfish punishers and a majority of
altruistic nonpunishers. Above the line (white background), conditions
of high proportions of powerful individuals and high symmetries of
power among individuals favor altruistic punishment over selfish
punishment, producing a dimorphic population of altruistic nonpun-
ishers and altruistic punishers. Overall, total altruism (frequency of
individuals expressing altruism in the cooperation phase) is fixed
(>99%) under the governance of altruistic punishment but reduced in
populations controlled by selfish punishers. Dashed lines within the
light gray region delineate boundaries based on total altruism. While
selfish punishment and altruistic nonpunishment form an equilibrium,
the exact mixture varies slightly based on x and P. Arrows indicate the
change in the outcome of a population when either increasing the
disparity of power (moving left) or concentrating power in a few
individuals (moving down).
Figure 4. When holding all other variables at baseline conditions
(most notably, P ¼ .3), the variation of symmetry of power (x) and
solitary value (S), or better understood as the consequences of pun-
ishment (1 S), produces one of the three equilibriums. The solid line
indicates the boundary between conditions producing these equili-
briums. The white background delineates conditions of high symme-
tries of power among individuals and great consequences to
punishment that favor altruistic punishment over selfish punishment,
producing dimorphic populations of altruistic nonpunishers and
altruistic punishers. The light gray background marks conditions of
low symmetry of power and limited consequences of punishment
which favor selfish punishment as it readily became fixed (>99% of the
population) as the preferred conditional strategy. This leads the
population to converge on a dimorphic equilibrium comprised of a
minority of powerful selfish punishers and a majority of altruistic
nonpunishers. The medium gray background reveals conditions
whereby weak consequences of punishment, and/or reduced sym-
metry of power renders either form of punishment ineffective and the
population falls to pure selfishness, attaining fixation in both pheno-
typic expression and conditional strategy. Dashed lines within the light
gray region delineate boundaries based on total altruism. Arrows
indicate the change in the outcome of a population when either
increasing the disparity of power (moving left) or weakening the
consequences for social transgression (moving down).
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as a conditional strategy when symmetry of power (x) is
increased (b ¼ 0.252, df ¼ 3,996, p < .001), power is more
distributed (P; b ¼ 0.372, df ¼ 3,996, p < .001), and solitary
value (S) is reduced (severity of punishment, 1  S; b ¼ –
0.403, df ¼ 3,996, p < .001). A separate multiple regression
analysis on the subset of conditions only of up to S ¼ 0.55
revealed that these relationships only strengthened (x: b ¼
0.459, df ¼ 2,196, p < .001; P: b ¼ 0.673, df ¼ 2,196, p <
.001; S: b ¼ –0.441, df ¼ 2,196, p < .001). In other words,
leveling the playing field leads to less cheating, more coopera-
tive forms of punishment when cheating does occur, and a
generally more egalitarian society.
Analytically, the condition for which selfish punishment
outcompetes altruistic punishment within groups (Equation 8)
is dependent on the symmetry of power (x; Equation 8 config-
ured in terms of x to Equation 9).
wsp > wap: ð8Þ
Rþ naRm
n
 xCðns  1Þ
 
ðI  eÞ þ RSe > naRm
n
 xCns
 
I ;
nam
n e RðI  eþ SeÞ
CðI  eþ nseÞ < x: ð9Þ
When x is low (high disparity in power), selfish punishment
is advantageous, and when x is high (individuals are more
symmetric in power), altruistic punishment is advantageous.
What is not shown analytically is the effect x has on the prob-
ability of being expelled and receiving the solitary payoff. A
separate set of simulations varying x from 0.05 to 1 (at 0.05
increments and replicated 10 times) illustrated that as the dis-
parity of power is increased (decreasing x), the probability of
powerful selfish individuals avoiding punishment and remain-
ing in the group increases compared to their less powerful
counterparts (see Figure 6). In other words, as relative power
over others is increased, the benefits of hypocrisy and corrup-
tion are also enhanced.
Figure 5. When holding all other variables at baseline conditions
(most notably, x ¼ .5), the proportion of powerful individuals (P) and
solitary value (S), or otherwise understood as the consequences of
punishment (1  S), produces one of the three equilibriums. The solid
line indicates the boundary between conditions producing these
equilibriums. The white background indicates conditions of high dis-
tributions of power among individuals and severe consequences of
punishment that favor altruistic punishment over selfish punishment
and produce dimorphic populations of altruistic nonpunishers and
altruistic punishers. The light gray background marks conditions of the
concentration of power among relatively few individuals and limited
consequences of punishment which favor selfish punishment as it
readily became fixed (>99% of the population) as the preferred con-
ditional strategy, leading the population to converge on a dimorphic
equilibrium comprised of a minority of powerful selfish punishers and
a majority of altruistic nonpunishers. The medium gray background
reveals conditions again whereby weak consequences of punishment,
and/or the concentration of power in a few individuals, render either
form of punishment ineffective and the population falls to pure self-
ishness, attaining fixation in both phenotypic expression and condi-
tional strategy. Dashed lines within the light gray region delineate
boundaries based on total altruism. Arrows indicate the change in the
outcome of a population when either weakening the consequences for
social transgression (moving left) or reducing the distribution of
power (moving down).
Figure 6. Overall, as symmetry of power decreases (power disparity
increases), selfish individuals with greater power are less likely to be
punished compared to their counterparts lacking a power advantage.
As symmetry of power (S) decreases (or increasing power asymme-
try), those with power are more likely to avoid punishment and
remain part of group interactions compared to those without power.
Open circles with the dashed quadratic fit line mark the difference in
the proportion of rounds participating in group interactions between
selfish nonpunishers with power and those without power in relation
to symmetry of power (F¼ 842.89, df¼ 209, p < .001, R2¼ .80). Filled
circles with the solid quadratic fit line mark the difference in the
proportion of rounds participating in group interactions between
selfish punishers with power and those without power in relation to
symmetry of power (F ¼ 1,183.35, df ¼ 209, p < .001, R2 ¼ .85).
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A World Without Corruption
To confirm that power disparity disproportionately favors self-
ish punishment (corruption and hypocrisy) more so than
altruistic punishment, we ran the model across the previous
parameter space but prohibiting the existence of the selfish
punishment strategy. The initial population comprised of the
same 50–50% mix of altruism and selfishness, while the entire
initial frequency of punishers (10%) was of the altruistic type.
In comparison, the previous conditions involved a population
of 10% punishers, with 5% altruistic punishers and the other
5% as selfish punishers. Overall, results suggest that a world
without corruption is actually more vulnerable to selfishness
than one with it.
When precluding enforcement by power selfish punish-
ers, populations readily transition directly from pure altru-
ism to pure selfishness as any form of power disparity
grows (see Figures 7–9). In comparison, when allowing for
the possibility of corruption, altruism can be maintained by
a minority of powerful selfish punishers in populations that
would otherwise descend to pure selfishness (see Figures 3–
5). This ability of selfish punishers to save a population that
would otherwise collapse increases the parameter space in
which altruism is viable. When directly comparing between
the outcomes of simulations including (Figures 3–5) and
excluding selfish punishment (Figures 7–9), altruism is
maintained in a wider range of parameter space with their
inclusion. However, a closer look revealed that despite the
overall increase in the range in which altruism is viable, it
also corresponds with a reduction in the parameter space
whereby altruism evolves to fixation (>99%). This is
expected as the inherent selfish nature of selfish punishment
ultimately limits the level of altruism that can be maintained
in the population.
In summary, the power has quite different effects on the
alternative punishment strategies. Increasing power (x),
reducing the distribution of power (P), and reducing the con-
sequences of punishment (S) all favor selfish punishment
(corruption) over altruistic punishment. Even with selfish
punishment excluded, increasing the disparity of power
through any of the three variables (x, P, and S) serves to the
detriment of altruism and altruistic punishment. Although this
outcome might appear surprising at first, it has been demon-
strated previously that selfish punishers, through directly off-
setting of the costs of punishment, can better invade and
Figure 7.Outcome of simulations that prohibited the selfish punisher
strategy. Similar to Figure 2, when holding all other variables at
baseline conditions (most notably, S ¼ 0.4), the variation of symmetry
of power (x) and proportion of powerful individuals (P) produces one
of the two equilibriums. However, unlike with populations including
selfish punishers (Figure 2), only one outcome includes altruism.
Below the line (gray background), in conditions consisting of low
proportions of power individuals and/or low symmetry of power
between individuals, selfish nonpunishers quickly evolve to fixation in
the population. Above the line (white background), conditions of high
proportions of powerful individuals and high symmetries of power
among individuals allow for altruistic punishment to effectively curtail
selfishness, producing a dimorphic population of altruistic nonpun-
ishers and altruistic punishers. Overall, in this region maintained by
altruistic punishers, total altruism (frequency of individuals expressing
altruism in the cooperation phase) is fixed (>99%). Arrows indicate
the change in the outcome of a population when either increasing the
disparity of power (moving left) or concentrating power in a few
individuals (moving down).
Figure 8.Outcome of simulations that prohibited the selfish punisher
strategy. When holding all other variables at baseline conditions (most
notably, P ¼ .3), the variation in symmetry of power (x) and solitary
value (S), or also considered as the consequences of punishment (1 
S), produces one of the two equilibriums. The white background
indicates conditions that favor the evolution and fixation of altruism in
the population (altruism in the cooperation phase at >99%). The gray
background reveals conditions whereby weak consequences of pun-
ishment and/or reduced symmetry of power undermine punishment
and the population falls to pure selfishness (>99% frequency for both
phenotypic expression and conditional selfish nonpunisher strategies).
Arrows indicate the change in the outcome of a population when
either increasing the disparity of power (moving left) or weakening the
consequences for social transgression (moving down).
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maintain altruism in more selfish populations than their
altruistic punisher counterparts (Eldakar et al., 2007). Power
only exacerbates these effects. Although morally perplexing,
corruption in the form of selfish punishment can both save and
limit altruism in a society.
Discussion
Punishment, whether selfish or altruistic, has been shown to be
effective in curtailing selfishness in populations (Fehr & Ga¨ch-
ter, 2002). By directly reducing the fitness of defectors relative
to altruists within groups, punishers diminish the within-group
evolutionary advantage of selfishness. The punishment itself,
however, is disadvantageous within groups due to the cost of
punishment falling solely on the punishers, qualifying punish-
ment as a form of altruism (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, 2004; Boyd
et al., 2003; Eldakar & Wilson, 2008; Fehr, 2004; Pancha-
nathan & Boyd, 2004; Yamagishi, 1986). Selfish punishment
eliminates this disadvantage by hypocritically coupling selfish
behavior (within-group advantage) with punishment, increas-
ing its ability to restore altruism in predominantly selfish popu-
lations more so than altruistic punishment. Just as with pure
selfishness, however, selfish punishment is disadvantageous at
the group level compared to altruistic punishment. Groups
maintained by altruistic punishment are able to achieve greater
degrees of altruism on average than groups governed by selfish
punishers. This sentiment is illustrated in the field of econom-
ics, whereby it has been shown that hypocrisy in the form of
corruption reduces economic growth (Mauro, 1995) and under-
mines criminal justice, where a “clean police force is a crucial
barometer of a healthy society” (Punch, 2000, p. 301). This
group-level advantage becomes paramount once selfishness is
effectively reduced in the population, prompting a transition
from selfish punishment to altruistic punishment in the overall
population (Eldakar et al., 2013).
While examples of this transition are not uncommon (see
Eldakar et al., 2013, for an extended discussion), this process
may be interrupted by various factors including asymmetries in
power among individuals. Here, we have shown that while an
asymmetric power advantage allows some individuals to more
effectively punish transgression, it also carries with it a greater
temptation to defect. Although previous models have explored
the influence of power asymmetries on the evolution of altruis-
tic punishment (de Weerd & Verbrugge, 2011; Przepiorka &
Diekmann, 2013), these do not include the possibility of selfish
punishment and thus preclude the emergence of hypocrisy
(e.g., corruption). As symmetry of power decreases, those with
power are increasingly able to defect with impunity, favoring
selfish punishment over altruistic punishment. With decreases
in the symmetry of power, this dynamic leads to a slippery
slope where those that provide protection from exploitation
may slide down the path to corruption.
There is no shortage of examples where power asymmetries
lead those with power to both exploit and limit the exploitation
of others. In modern human societies, violent youth gangs have
been shown to form in regions where governmental enforce-
ment is absent, effectively providing a mechanism to reduce
further violence (Sobel & Osoba, 2009). This is similar to
members of the mafia, who partake in both committing and
reducing overall crime in their local region and are believed to
have emerged due to a lack of government protection (Fioren-
tini & Peltzman, 1995; Lupo, 2013). This concept is also com-
mon in the expression of dominance hierarchies that are
ubiquitous in nature (Huntingford & Turner, 1987), ranging
from humans (Boehm, 1999) to amoebas (Fortunato, Queller,
& Strassmann, 2003), and are based on the premise of power
asymmetries (Wilson, 1975). In nonhuman primates, leading
members of dominance hierarchies maintain social order yet
receive disproportionately greater benefits from the group
(Boehm, 1999; de Waal, 1990; Flack et al., 2005, 2006) and
may even directly perform the behaviors they are most vigilant
against (Hauser & Marler, 1993).
While serving as inspiring examples of prosociality
(Wilson, 1975), the social insects also provide a dark reflection
of our own social institutions. Driven by power asymmetry and
filled with tales of corruption (Wenseleers et al., 2005) and
coercion (Ratnieks & Wenseleers, 2008), scientific observa-
tions of eusocial insect societies are more reminiscent of dra-
matic political novels than of utopian societies (Whitfield,
Figure 9.Outcome of simulations that prohibited the selfish punisher
strategy. When holding all other variables at baseline conditions (most
notably, x¼ .5), the proportion of powerful individuals (P) and solitary
value (S), or otherwise understood as the consequences of punish-
ment (1  S), produces one of the two equilibriums. The white
background indicates conditions of high distributions of power among
individuals and severe consequences to punishment that favor the
evolution of altruism maintained by altruistic punishment. The gray
background reveals conditions whereby weak consequences of pun-
ishment and concentration of power in a few individuals favor pure
selfishness, attaining fixation in both phenotypic expression and con-
ditional strategy. Arrows indicate the change in the outcome of a
population when either weakening the consequences for social
transgression (moving left) or reducing the distribution of power
(moving down).
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2002). In the queenless ants of the subfamily Ponerinae, repro-
ductive dominance is maintained through the suppression of
others and, in some cases, involves physical mutilation
(Diacamma australe; Peeters & Higashi, 1989). While related-
ness has been attributed as both a driver (Foster, Weneleers, &
Ratnieks, 2006) and byproduct (Wilson & Ho¨lldobler, 2005) of
eusociality in insects, it has also been shown to influence which
individuals perform the policing of worker-laid eggs (Foster &
Ratnieks, 2000). Based on genetic incentive (relatedness to
eggs), queens of the wasp Dolichovespula saxonica that are
singly mated perform policing in their respective colonies,
whereas workers of multiply-mated queens assume the role
of enforcement. Nevertheless, in social insects, the term
“corrupt policing” has been applied to enforcers of tree wasp
Dolichovespula sylvestris because those that limit cheating
(i.e., laying eggs) were also the individuals most likely to
cheat (Wenseleers et al., 2005). This may also be descriptive
of general scenarios of policing by queens in which coopera-
tion is induced by coercion (Ratnieks & Wenseleers, 2008).
Not surprising, when the monarch falls, there is a power
vacuum causing a loss of colony productivity (Strassmann
et al., 2004). Furthermore, in some cases, power is transferred
via asexual reproduction to keep ruling authority among those
with highest genetic similarity despite the costs of reduced
genetic diversity suffered by the colony (Matsuura et al.,
2009). This is not unlike what occurs in human societies with
succession through kin.
Interestingly, in our model, power asymmetries do not
necessarily lead to the complete erosion of altruism, and in
some conditions, the presence of corruption can prevent the
failure of a society. Upon further consideration, coercion and
corruption in the form of hypocrisy are quite stable in main-
taining cooperation in social insects (Whitfield, 2002) and rep-
resent the foundation of social dominance relationships
(Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995), which exist due to their sta-
bility and reduction of conflict. However, as demonstrated in
our model, overexploitation does run the risk of undermining
group success to the point of failure, an observation recently
echoed by the 43rd president of the United States, George W.
Bush, stating “Power can be very addictive and it can be
corrosive” (interview on NBC’s Today, on February 27, 2017).
While asymmetries in power favored selfish punishment,
the opposite was true for altruistic punishment. This is not
surprising when considering how one of the pitfalls of altruistic
punishment is the ability to recover the costs of punishment.
While disparity in power aids in the ability of selfish punishers
to recoup these costs, altruistic punishment is effective when
the costs of punishment are shared among many equally capa-
ble punishers. This distribution of costs is best achieved by
mechanisms such as conformance bias transmission (Henrich
& Boyd, 2001), coalitional enforcement (Bingham, 1999),
coordination (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010; Perc, 2012), or
even by using cost-effective strategies such as gossip (Kniffin
& Wilson, 2005; Wilson, Wilczynski, Wells, & Weiser, 2000).
It is straightforward to see instances whereby power cor-
rupts, but the corruption of democratically elected officials
seems contradictory to general findings as these officials can
be “punished” at the polls during reelection (Rose-Ackerman,
1999b). Thus, the relationship between corruption and
democracy is not so straightforward. For example, narrow-
interest groups can wield great political power in the presence
of weak political parties, thus focusing power to a few. Corrup-
tion can infest systems between closely matched political par-
ties, also concentrating power among the few (Rose-Ackerman,
1999b).
Our results also closely resemble hypothesized patterns of
enforcement during hominid evolution. It has been proposed
that linear dominance hierarchies were maintained through dis-
parities in power between individuals but that the evolved abil-
ity to throw rocks and fashion weapons provided a leveling
mechanism which led to the emergence of egalitarianism
(Boehm, 1999). Coincidentally, it is not surprising that human
societies are abound with examples of abuse of power as the
result of failed leveling mechanisms. While enforcement of
altruism exists across a variety of scenarios and social systems,
disparities in power influence the nature of this enforcement. It
can transform punishment from a mechanism that promotes
altruism to one that exploits and potentially destroys it.
In this report, we set out to understand the role of power
asymmetries in the evolution of altruism and punishment. Pun-
ishment provides a robust mechanism to promote altruism and
keep selfishness at bay, but mechanisms that increase disparity
in power bring along the seeds of corruption. Here, we pro-
vided a simplistic model to address a fundamental observation
that power fuels self-interest. Our results, along with various
observations from the animal kingdom and human societies,
suggest that power is a principle factor in the structure of social
systems and social control.
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